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Abstract
Sensitive data protection is essential for mobile users. Plausibly Deniable Encryption (PDE) systems
provide an effective manner to protect sensitive data by hiding them on the device. However, existing PDE
systems can lose data due to overriding the hidden volume, waste physical storage because of the “reserved
area” used for avoiding data loss, and require device reboot when using the hidden volume. This paper
presents MobiGyges, a hidden volume based mobile PDE system, to fill the gap. MobiGyges addresses the
problem of data loss by restricting each storage block used only by one volume, and it improves storage
utilization by eliminating the “reserved area”. MobiGyges can also avoid device reboot by mounting the
hidden volume dynamically on-demand with the Dynamic Mounting service. Moreover, we identify two novel
PDE oriented attacks, the capacity comparison attack and the fill-to-full attack. MobiGyges can defend them
by jointly leveraging the Shrunk U-disk method and multi-level deniability. We implement the MobiGyges
proof-of-concept system on a real mobile phone Google Nexus 6P with LineageOS 13. Experimental results
show that MobiGyges prevents data loss, avoids device reboot, improves storage utilization by over 30%
with acceptable performance overhead compared with current works.
Keywords: data loss preventing, hidden volume, improving storage utilization, sensitive data protection,
avoiding reboot
1. Introduction
Mobile devices (e.g., smartphones) have become
prevalent in recent years, especially in the era of 5G
and the Internet of Things (IoTs) [1]. Hence, pro-
tecting private and sensitive data on mobile devices
are very important to users [2, 3]. One existing solu-
tion is to use Full Disk Encryption (FDE) [4]. FDE
uses an encrypting key to encrypt user data before
storing it on a device and decrypt the data before
applications using it [5]. Nonetheless, FDE is not
secure because sensitive data can be compromised
when the encryption key is exposed, since the en-
crypted data can be easily decrypted with the only
encryption key.
Recent works [6–10] propose Plausibly Deniable
Encryption (PDE) to enhance the security. PDE
is a data protection paradigm that protects sensi-
tive data on both stationary systems and mobile
systems by providing deniability for the sensitive
data. Deniability means that sensitive data owner
can deny the existence of the data. Modern PDE
systems use the hidden volume mechanism to im-
plement the deniability. The hidden volume based
PDE system stores the sensitive data on the hidden
volume, yet the hidden volume itself is concealed
inside the device. Logically, the storage space on
the hidden volume based PDE systems can be di-
vided into hidden volumes and an outer volume.
The outer volume is visible to all users for daily
purposes and will be used automatically as the sys-
tem starts up, while hidden volumes are concealed
in the device and store the sensitive data.
Such hidden volume based solutions have the fol-
lowing limitations:
• Data loss. Hidden volumes are concealed in-
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Figure 1: Data loss caused by data override. The outer
volume writes data on hidden volume occupied blocks.
side the outer volume [7–11], but the outer vol-
ume does not know the existence of hidden vol-
umes. Therefore, it is likely to write data on
the storage blocks that are occupied by hidden
volumes. Thus, sensitive data stored on the
hidden volume will be lost. Figure 1 shows an
example of data overriding between the outer
volume and the hidden volume. In the figure,
the outer volume considers all the storage space
(red space) to be usable. When the outer vol-
ume writes data on the space of the hidden
volume (purple space), the data on the hidden
volume will be lost.
• Storage waste. Studies [7–10, 12] attempt
to solve the data loss problem by placing the
hidden volume into a “reserved area”, and the
outer volume will not write data to that area.
The size of the “reserved area” is bigger than
the capacity of the hidden volume. As depicted
in Figure 2a, in previous works, the right part
(green blocks plus the blue block) of the phys-
ical volume is reserved for the hidden volume.
Since the capacity of the hidden volume (the
blue block) is much smaller than that of the
“reserved area”, the hidden volume can “float”
inside the “reserved area”. Hence, the exact
starting position of the hidden volume can be
arbitrary, hidden volumes are thus protected.
However, this mechanism could waste a large
amount of storage space (green blocks). We
find in these solutions [7–9], up to 45%1 of the
total storage space is wasted, which is huge for
the resource-limited mobile devices.
• Device reboot. State-of-the-art works use
1Including storage space taken up by the structure of a
file system. The calculation of the utilization is detailed in
Section 7.
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Figure 2: Hidden volume is placed into a reserved area
to avoid data override. Large amount of storage space is
wasted. MobiGyges can fully utilize almost all the storage
space.
two modes in their system, namely, the nor-
mal mode and the PDE mode [7–11]. The
normal mode uses the outer volume while the
PDE mode uses the hidden volume, respec-
tively. When users want to use the hidden
volume, they have to use the PDE mode. How-
ever, device reboot is required to switch modes.
Rebooting the device to use the PDE mode
wastes time and is not convenient for users es-
pecially those who want to use the hidden vol-
ume urgently.
Apart from the drawbacks, we identify two pos-
sible PDE oriented attacks (detailed in Section 4)
that might compromise the sensitive data, and cur-
rent solutions fail to defend.
• The capacity comparison attack. The at-
tacker may discover the hidden volume by com-
paring the capacity of the outer volume and
the hidden volume. If their capacities are dif-
ferent, the attacker can doubt the device is par-
ticularly designed, which is prone to expose the
hidden volume and hence compromises the sen-
sitive data. For example, a 32GB device uses
5GB for the hidden volume, so the capacity of
the outer volume is 27GB. The attacker can
doubt about the 5GB capacity difference, and
conduct further investigation.
• The fill-to-full attack. If the attacker iden-
tifies the potential existence of the hidden vol-
2
Figure 3: Data protection systems classification.
ume, he/she may conduct the fill-to-full attack
to explore the real capacity of the outer volume
by writing arbitrary data to the outer volume
and filling it until full. After filling the outer
volume, the attacker gets the audited informa-
tion and conducts the capacity comparison at-
tack. If the real capacity is different from that
of the physical disk, the hidden volume will be
compromised.
Existing solutions cannot solve the three prob-
lems simultaneously, and they cannot defend the
two attacks. To this end, we present MobiGyges in
this paper. MobiGyges is a hidden volume based
PDE system. It introduces the Volume Manage-
ment module and FDE module, which prevents sen-
sitive data loss by restricting each storage block us-
able by solely one volume, and improves the stor-
age utilization by eliminating the “reserved area”
(as shown in Figure 2b), and avoids rebooting
the device to use the hidden volume by introduc-
ing the Dynamic Mounting service that mounts
the hidden volume on-demand. MobiGyges also
uses the Shrunk U-disk method (detailed in Sec-
tion 5.3.1(3)) and multi-level deniability (detailed
in Section 5.3.2(3)) to jointly defend the aforemen-
tioned attacks.
Our main contribution in this paper is threefold,
summarized as follows.
• We propose MobiGyges to solve the data over-
riding problem, improve storage utilization
with the aid of Thin Provisioning and Device
Mapper, and avoid device reboot to use the
hidden volume on-demand by introducing the
Dynamic Mounting service.
• We identify the capacity comparison attack
and the fill-to-full attack, and propose the
Shrunk U-disk method and multi-level denia-
bility to jointly defend them.
• We implement the MobiGyges proof-of-
concept system on Google Nexus 6P with
the LineageOS [13] 13 by porting Thin-
Provisioning (pdata tools) and Logical Volume
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Figure 4: Encrypted logical volume and physical storage.
Applications use the normal system call to read or write data
to the encrypted logical volume. The dm-crypt Linux mod-
ule automatically encrypts and decrypts the data between
the encrypted logical volume and the physical disk.
Management (LVM) into the Android system
and implementing a TriggerApp to use hid-
den volume on-demand secretly. We conduct
experiments to evaluate MobiGyges’s storage
utilization, performance overhead, and experi-
mental results show that MobiGyes reaches all
our design goal and improves storage utiliza-
tion by over 30% compared with current solu-
tions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces related works, and Section 3
presents the threat model and assumptions. In Sec-
tion 4, we introduce our newly identified PDE ori-
ented attacks. Section 5 presents the design of Mo-
biGyges. In Section 6, we present the implemen-
tation of MobiGyges with LineageOS 13 on Google
Nexus 6P. In Section 7, we conduct rigorous exper-
iments and analyze the experimental results. Sec-
tion 8 discusses common attacks defended by Mo-
biGyges, the drawback, and possible future works.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 9.
2. Related Works
Data protection is of paramount importance, and
there have already been various systems proposed
for security. In this section, we categorize current
data protection systems (as shown in Figure 3) and
introduce related works based on the taxonomy.
Other types of file systems like versioning file sys-
tem [14] that are useful in post-intrusion file system
analysis applications, or reliable file retention and
retrievability required by legal regulations for sensi-
tive data management. However, they are not suit-
able for personal sensitive data protection. Hence,
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they are out of the scope of this paper and, there-
fore, not discussed here.
2.1. Full Disk Encryption
FDE is an elementary way to prevent sensitive
data from attacks by encrypting all data on a vol-
ume. As shown in Figure 4, on Linux based sys-
tems, FDE creates an encrypted logical volume
with dm-crypt Linux kernel module, and it en-
crypts all the data that saved on the logical volume
before committing to the physical storage. Simi-
larly, when an application needs to read data, it
automatically decrypts the data from the physical
storage and redirects the data to the logical volume.
Thus, FDE is transparent to applications. FDE has
now been a standard configuration for any security
system. There are many mature FDE solutions,
e.g., TrueCrypt [15, 16], BitLocker [17, 18], LUKS
(Linux Unified Key Setup) [19], FileVault [20].
TrueCrypt [15, 16] is a cross-platform encryption
software that supports multiple cipher encryption
scheme. It underpins various ways for both software
architecturally and hardware chip performance im-
provement to speed up the full disk encryption pro-
cess. TrueCrypt supports PDE, which will be in-
troduced in Section 2.2.2.
BitLocker [17, 18] is a built-in encryption util-
ity software on Windows developed by Microsoft to
conduct FDE. It has been a system-level compo-
nent since Windows Vista. The default encryption
scheme is AES with cipher block chaining (CBC) or
XTS with a 128-bit or 256-bit key. Note that CBC
is not used over the whole disk but applied to each
individual sector.
LUKS [19] (Linux Unified Key Setup) is an en-
cryption specification for Linux used for employing
FDE. Unlike most of the encryption software cre-
ates their own encryption functionality. LUKS cre-
ates a unified encryption format that can be used
for various tools like cryptsetup.
FileVault [20] is another FDE solution introduced
with Mac OS X Panther by Apple Inc. As recom-
mended by NIST [21], it uses the AES-XTS mode
of AES with 128-bit blocks and a 256-bit key to
encrypt the disk.
However, since FDE uses only one encryption
key, all the FDE-only solutions fail to provide users
the deniability of sensitive data stored on their de-
vices, which is not enough for protecting the sensi-
tive data.
2.2. Plausibly Deniable Encryption
PDE is the kind of encryption paradigm that pro-
vides the user with the ability to deny the existence
of sensitive data on the device. There are primar-
ily two ways of implementing PDE: Steganography
and the hidden volume.
2.2.1. Steganography
An example of Steganography is hiding sensitive
data into a multimedia file like a photo, a video or
an audio file as noise points. Since people tend to
ignore those noise points, the sensitive data is thus
protected. However, this technique requires a large
amount of computation, which is not appropriate
for mobile devices, because mobile devices lack of
computation and storage resources. StegFS [22] is
a steganography-based file system, and its key idea
is to hide data in a bunch of cover files. Another
work [23] uses external entropy sources and erasure
codes to deniably and reliably store data within the
unallocated space of an existing file system. How-
ever, these solutions has the following shortcom-
ings. i) It wastes storage space. ii) The perfor-
mance is low especially when writing. iii) The pos-
sibility of data loss is high. iv) The modification
of Ext2 may lead to compromise of deniability. All
these shortcomings make it not suitable for mobile
devices.
2.2.2. Hidden volume
Hidden volumes achieve PDE by concealing
themselves into a device. It is light weighted and
has minimum computational and storage burdens.
However, current hidden volume solutions have
mainly three drawbacks that we have pointed out in
Section 1, and these drawbacks cannot be addressed
at the same time. In this section, we classify works
based on the drawbacks they solve as follows.
(a) Data loss reducing solutions
TrueCrypt [15] and FreeOTFE [24] are PC PDE
solutions. They can create hidden volume(s) as files
or physical volumes. However, both TrueCrypt and
FreeOTFE can only create PDE hidden volume on
their resource files. Therefore, if these files are bro-
ken or lost, all the data stored on the hidden vol-
umes will be lost. Thus, the solution is prone to
compromise the sensitive data.
Mobiflage [7] is the first implementation of mo-
bile hidden volume based PDE prototype system
4
Table 1: Feature comparison between MobiGyges and current works. (3 means the functionality is provided, 7 means the
functionality is not available, and — means not applicable.)
Features Mobiflage [7] MobiHydra [8] MobiPluto [9] MobiMimosa [11] MobiCeal [12] MobiGyges
Data loss preven-
tion
3 3 3 7 3 3
Reserved area
elimination
7 7 7 — 7 3
Device Reboot
avoidance
7 7 7 7 3 3
Capacity compari-
son attack defense
7 7 7 7 7 3
Fill-to-full attack
defense
— — — — — 3
on Android. To avoid sensitive data loss, Mobi-
flage reserves a block of storage space and places
the hidden volume at an arbitrary position in the
area. We call it the “reserved area” technique.
However, up to 45% of the total physical storage is
wasted. Based on Mobiflage, MobiHydra [8] imple-
ments multi-level deniability. However, similar to
Mobiflage, MobiHydra also fails to solve the prob-
lem of low storage utilization.
MobiPluto [9, 10] is the first file system friendly
PDE solution built on the Android operating sys-
tem. It leverages virtual logical volumes techniques,
and all block-based file system can run on it without
modifications. It also addresses the data loss prob-
lem by placing the hidden volume into a “reserved
area”, therefore, the storage utilization is low.
MobiCeal [12] is another recent hidden volume
PDE solution, and its key contribution is to defend
against strong coercive multi-snapshot adversaries.
It does not consider the storage waste and capacity
inconsistency problems in previous solutions.
(b) High storage utilization solutions
MobiMimosa [11] is our former work of the hid-
den volume based PDE solution for the Android.
Its key idea is manually choosing storage blocks on
a physical device and converting the blocks into a
hidden volume. However, the location information
of the storage blocks is stored on a dm table file.
Once getting the file, the attacker can easily get
the sensitive data, and if the dm table file is lost,
all the sensitive data on the hidden volume will be
lost.
TrustGyges [25] addresses the above problem by
storing the dm table file on to a cloud server.
In order to avoid run-time attack, it fetches the
dm table file inside the Trust Execution Environ-
ment (TEE). However, it fails to propose a proper
method to use the hidden volume without the net-
work connection.
Our earlier work [26] first proposes to use the
Shrunk U-disk method to hide the hidden volume,
which achieves high storage utilization and avoids
data loss simultaneously. However, it fails to sup-
port using the hidden volume without rebooting the
device, and it cannot mitigate the fill-to-full attack.
(c) Reboot avoiding solutions
MobiCeal [12] is the latest PDE solution and is
the only mobile PDE solution that does not require
device reboot. Similar to all other solutions, it still
has the concept of normal mode and PDE mode. Its
main concern is how to fastly switch from the public
mode to the hidden mode (PDE mode). It achieves
the device reboot avoidance by restarting the An-
droid framework. Although, it reduces the switch
time, but the time of restarting the Android frame-
work is still too long (≈10s for entering the PDE
mode and≈70s for returning to normal mode). Fur-
thermore, applications will suffer response lags after
restarting the Android framework that results from
CPU cache misses, and hence influences the user
experience.
2.2.3. Functionality Comparison
Although mobile PDE has been explored by [7–
9, 11, 12], we differentiate MobiGyges with them in
Table 1 on key features desired for PDE oriented
data protections.
First, most of the current solutions use the “re-
served area” to prevent data loss resulting from
data override on the hidden volume. Therefore,
they fail to utilize the storage space efficiently. Sec-
ond, all current works cannot defend our newly
identified two novel PDE oriented attacks. Conse-
quently, the possibility of exposing the hidden vol-
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ume and compromising the sensitive data is high.
Our proposed MobiGyges system can address all of
these issues at the same time.
3. Threat Model and System Assumptions
The key to protect sensitive data on a hidden
volume based PDE system is concealing the hidden
volume [27]. We propose the following threat model
and put the beneath assumptions for MobiGyges
based on works presented in [7, 8].
1. The attacker knows that the userdata par-
tition is encrypted by FDE and also the key
of this encryption. But the attacker lacks the
knowledge of MobiGygess design. Thus, the
attackers still cannot retrieve the sensitive data
because they do not know where and how to do
that. Alternatively, the attacker knows about
the design of MobiGyges; but, not sure how
many hidden volumes there are on the phone.
2. The attacker knows the design of MobiGyges
but is uncertain if the key provided by users is
the key to the hidden volume he sought.
3. The attacker can get root privilege and the
physical storage of the phone or dump the raw
data from the storage medium.
It is notoriously hard to achieve security on a device
with backdoor hardware or software. Therefore, as-
sumptions involving the backdoors of the device are
necessary for us to design MobiGyges. We make the
following assumptions accordingly.
1. The hardware of users phone is backdoor-free.
2. The system level software (e.g., boot-
loader and the mobile operating system) are
backdoor-free.
Without these assumptions, user’s operational be-
havior can be monitored, which is impossible to
conceal the hidden volume and protect the sensi-
tive data stored on it.
4. Novel PDE Oriented Attacks
In this section, we introduce our identified two
novel PDE oriented attacks and assume attacker
A conducts the following attacks. Since these two
attacks are correlated with each other, we propose
joint solutions to defend the attacks.
Table 2: Notation definitions used throughout the paper
.
Notation Description
A An attacker.
D A mobile device.
Cp The physical capacity of the device
D.
Co The capacity of the device D’s outer
volume.
Ol The sector offset of the mapping log-
ical volume.
Sl The number of sectors of the origi-
nal volume.
T The mapping type.
Dp The mapped device.
Op The offset of the mapped physical
volume.
Sm The size of metadata volume.
Sp The size of pool volume.
Sc The chunk size of pool volume.
N The name of the hidden volume.
T (s, b) The trim function that trims string
s into a b-length string.
h(x) The hash function that hashes vari-
able x into a hash value.
η The storage utilization.
Offset The hidden volume offset in Mobi-
flage [7].
vlen The capacity of the device in Mobi-
flage [7].
H(x) The PBKDF2 iterated hash func-
tion in Mobiflage [7].
pwd The password of the hidden volume
in Mobiflage [7].
salt The random salt value for PBKDF2
in Mobiflage [7].
4.1. Capacity Comparison Attack
When PDE systems are created using hidden vol-
umes, the total capacity of the outer volume and
hidden volumes should be equal to the physical ca-
pacity. Hence, if untreated, the capacity of the out
volume will be smaller than the physical capacity.
By comparing the capacities of the outer volume
and the physical disk, the attacker can get the ca-
pacity inconsistency, and the capacity inconsistency
offers attacker A an indication of the potential exis-
tence of hidden volumes, which may lead to the at-
tacker A to conduct a further investigation. Thus,
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the attack makes hidden volume based PDE system
highly prone to compromise the sensitive data. We
formalize the attack as shown in Equation 1, and
all notation definitions can be found in Table 2.
A ← D ←
{
1, Cp > Co
0, Cp = Co
, (1)
where, D denotes the device, Cp is the physical ca-
pacity of the device, and Co is the capacity of the
outer volume. 1 represents device D has special de-
sign of its storage system (PDE is compromised),
and 0 otherwise.
Existing literature fails to defend the capacity
comparison attack. According to Equation 1, we
can leverage the second condition in the equation
to defend the attack by eliminating the capacity
difference between the outer volume and the phys-
ical disk. To this end, we have to find a method to
modify the capacity of the outer volume Co to be
the same as the physical capacity Cp. We detail the
method used of defending the attack in Section 5.
4.2. Fill-to-Full Attack
The fill-to-full attack is a complementary attack
of the capacity comparison attack. Suppose now
we can defend the capacity comparison attack by
setting the capacity of the outer volume to be the
same as that of the physical disk. Attacker A may
still doubt that the device might have hidden vol-
umes, but he/she is uncertain about it. To this end,
attacker A may write arbitrary data on the outer
volume by filling data to the outer volume and au-
diting the total size of the data that have been writ-
ten. After getting the audited information, attacker
A can further conduct the capacity comparison at-
tack by comparing the physical capacity with the
audited data size plus used capacity on the outer
volume before the fill-to-full attack.
We demonstrate the fill-to-full attack with a real-
world example. Suppose Alice has two containers:
one is a standard 1-liter container, and another is
marked as 3 liters. Alice wants to know if the sec-
ond container is a 3-liter container precisely as it
marked. She can fill up the 1-liter container with
water and pour the water to the 3-liter container for
3 times. If the total amount of water cannot fill up
the 3-liter container, or the 3-liter container over-
flows, Alice can confirm that the 3-liter container
does not have a 3-liter capacity. The fill-to-full at-
tack uses the same strategy.
Since the real size of the outer volume is smaller
than the physical capacity. The audited size should
be smaller than the physical capacity, which again
reduces to the capacity comparison attack as we
introduced in Section 4.1. In the next section, we
introduce MobiGyges design, including how we de-
fend the two attacks.
5. MobiGyges Design
In this section, we introduce the design of Mobi-
Gyges. MobiGyges is designed for protecting sensi-
tive user data rather than system data that include
program executables and data. We first present our
design considerations, and we then propose our de-
sign overview. As the Volume Management mod-
ule is the key component of MobiGyges, we finally
make a detailed anatomy of the design of the Vol-
ume Management module.
5.1. Design Considerations
The current hidden volume based PDE solutions
cannot address the aforementioned three problems
at the same time, and they also fail to defend the ca-
pacity comparison and the fill-to-full attacks. Mo-
biGyges is designed to conquer them all.
(1) Eliminating the data override issue.
The root of data loss is due to the data override phe-
nomenon between the outer volume and the hidden
volume(s), which two or more volumes access the
same storage block. Therefore, if we restrict one
physical storage block that can only be used by one
volume, the issue is addressed. Thus we can split
the total storage blocks into fine-grained storage
blocks instead of coarsely divide the whole physical
storage into two parts, and the outer volume and
the hidden volume(s) allocate storage space from
the fine-grained storage blocks (as shown in Fig-
ure 2b).
(2) Improving the storage space utiliza-
tion. As we have introduced, the low storage uti-
lization results from the “reserved area”. There-
fore, eliminating the “reserved area” can improve
the storage utilization.
(3) Avoiding device reboot. Rebooting the
device costs time, which is not convenient for users,
especially when users have to capture some impor-
tant data and want to store it immediately into the
hidden volume. We intend to avoid device reboot
7
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by mounting the hidden volume on-demand with-
out rebooting the device.
(4) Defending the novel PDE oriented at-
tacks. The capacity comparison and the fill-to-full
attacks result from the capacity inconsistency issue.
The challenge is how we defend the fill-to-full and
capacity comparison attacks.
5.2. Design Overview
MobiGyges is a mobile hidden volume based PDE
system. In this subsection, an overview of Mobi-
Gyges design, starting with a general description of
its components, is presented. Then, we propose a
so-called Shrunk U-Disk method to defend the ca-
pacity comparison attack, and we also leverage the
multi-level deniability to defend the fill-to-full at-
tack. Next, we introduce our design solution asso-
ciated with the design consideration introduced in
Section 5.1. Finally, we describe the user steps.
5.2.1. Solutions
With the design considerations discussed in Sec-
tion 5.1, we propose our PDE system design so-
lutions. i) We introduce an independent compo-
nent called the Volume Management module to
manage the outer volume and hidden volume(s)
rather than having the volumes themselves han-
dle the hidden volume concealing. It flexibly allo-
cates separate storage blocks for volumes and avoids
the override of the same storage space. The mod-
ule also eliminates the “reserved area” and thus
mitigates data loss and improves storage utiliza-
tion. We use a FDE component to encrypt the
Volume Management module and the file system
structure, which protects the system. ii) We de-
sign a userspace application called TriggerApp and
the dynamic mounting service to mitigate device
Physical disk
Outer volume Hidden volume
Metadata
Storage blocks mapping information
Figure 6: Splitting the physical disk into fine-grained storage
blocks (each block is represented by different colors), and
each fine-grained block is used only for one volume (blocks
of the outer volume and the hidden volume are allocated
from the split physical disk). Thus, the “reserved area” is
not required in the design. The occupancy information is
stored into the metadata datastore.
reboot. The dynamic mounting service can mount
the hidden volume without rebooting the device,
and TriggerApp can secretly trigger the use of hid-
den volumes and mount the hidden volume on-de-
mand using the dynamic mounting service with-
out rebooting the device. iii) We use the Shrunk
U-disk method and multi-level deniability jointly in
the Volume Management module to defend the ca-
pacity comparison and the fill-to-full attacks. In
terms of fill-to-full attack, we leverage multi-level
deniability by recording the size of data that has
already been written and redirecting the extra at-
tack IO requests to other places that will not take
up the physical storage space and finally making the
size of the attack IO plus the used capacity before
the attack equals the physical capacity. Moreover,
we employ the Shrunk U-disk method to defend
the capacity comparison attack by intentionally la-
beling the capacity of the outer volume capacity
equivalent to the physical capacity. We detail the
Shrunk U-disk method and multi-deniability in Sec-
tion 5.3.1(3) and Section 5.3.2(3).
5.2.2. Key Components
MobiGyges consists of four main components.
Volume Management module, FDE module, physi-
cal volume module, and TriggerApps module. i) The
Volume Management module is the most important
module of MobiGyges, and it manages the life-cy-
cle of all the outer volume and hidden volumes.
ii) FDE module is the encryption layer on top of
the physical storage to protect the Volume Man-
agement module, and iii) physical volume module
is the physical storage of the device provided by the
device vendor. iv) TriggerApp module is an appli-
cation, which is designed for the user to utilize the
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Trigger
App
Name 
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Dynamic Mounting
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Filter Mount
Figure 7: The Dynamic Mounting service structure. Autho-
rized App can mount the hidden volume on-demand.
hidden volume securely and conveniently without
requiring entering the detailed system commands.
Figure 5 depicts the data-flow in the entire Mo-
biGyges workflow and the inner data-flow between
MobiGyges components. As per the mentioned fig-
ure, (a) users first manipulate TriggerApps, and
(b) TiggerApps then generates data and exchanges
data between the Volume Management. (c) Next,
the Volume Management module processes the data
with Device Mapper and Thin Provisioning, and
sends Input/Output (IO) redirections to the FDE.
(d) PDE finally encrypts or decrypts data with the
dm-crypt kernel module and communicates with
the physical volume and commits data on the phys-
ical volume or reads data from it.
5.2.3. User steps
Steps for using MobiGyges:
1. Boot the device with MobiGyges. The outer
volume is mounted automatically. After boot-
ing up the device, the user can start using it
as an ordinary device for daily purposes.
2. When using hidden volumes, open TriggerApp
and enter a level (level of deniability is detailed
in Section 5.3.2) of the password to mount the
corresponding hidden volume without reboot-
ing the device.
3. If an attacker suspects that PDE exists on the
device and conducts the fill-to-full attack, the
user can use level 0 before then (detailed in
Section 5.3.1(4)) to defend the attack.
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Figure 8: Multi-level deniability. Level 0 is used to defend
the fill-to-full attack.
5.3. The Volume Management Module
This subsection details the design of the key part
of MobiGyges, the Volume Management module.
The Volume Management module leverages Thin
Provisioning and Device Mapper by converting the
physical storage into a Thin Pool and using the vir-
tual logical volume to manage the physical storage
in a fine-grained manner. In the rest of this sub-
section, we show how fine-grained storage blocks
used by the Volume Management module solves the
aforementioned problems and defends the attacks,
and we then anatomize each services in the module.
5.3.1. Volume Management Module Circumvention
(1) Data Loss and Low Storage Utilization
Elimination
MobiGyges avoids data loss and improves the low
storage utilization using the Volume Management
module with the following steps as shown in Fig-
ure 6.
i) The Volume Management module splits the
whole physical disk into fine-grained storage blocks
(i.e., 64KB), and then, ii) the module allocates each
fine-grained storage block only for one volume, so
the storage space of each volume is independent,
and the data on each fine-grained storage block can-
not be override by other volumes. Hence, the data
loss problem is avoided. iii) The module tracks the
usage of each fine-grained block, and stores volumes
and the storage block mapping information (meta-
data) in a special format and encrypts the meta-
data with FDE on the physical disk. The meta-
data is stored in the metadata logical volume as
shown in Figure 9. When allocating storage space
for the metadata logical volume, the available stor-
age blocks are first sorted from big to small, and the
least storage block that is larger than the needed
storage size is used. In the figure, we can see that
iv) no “reserved area” is used because of the exclu-
sive access of the same storage block from volumes,
and hence the storage utilization is improved.
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(2) Device Reboot Avoidance
MobiGyges avoids device reboot when using the
hidden volume by leveraging the Dynamic Mount-
ing service in the Volume Management module.
The Dynamic Mounting service first filters the
mounting request by identifying the owner of the
request, and it only allows authorized applications
(e.g., the TriggerApp) to mount the hidden volume.
The mounting request is sent associated with a to-
ken generated by using OAuth [28], and thus if the
token is not valid, the Dynamic Mounting service
rejects the request. Then the Dynamic Mounting
service calculates the name of the hidden volume
based on the given PDE password and mounts the
hidden volume on the mounting point. The proce-
dure is shown in Figure 7.
(3) Capacity Comparison Attack Defense
The attacker may conduct the capacity compar-
ison attack and the fill-to-full attack to expose the
hidden volume and compromise the sensitive data.
MobiGyges leverages the Shrunk U-disk method
to defend the capacity comparison attack. Shrunk
U-disk is a kind of disk labeled with a bigger capac-
ity, and operating systems also display the labeled
capacity to users. However, the real capacity of
the disk is smaller than the labeled capacity. For
example, a memory stick is labeled to have 32GB
storage, and the operating system also shows the
capacity is approximately2 equal to 32GB, but its
actual capacity is only 8GB. Only when exhausting
more than 8GB storage space on it, can the user
find out the trick. However, users usually would
not do that and cannot discover the “trick”. We
can exploit this “trick” to defend the capacity com-
parison attack by simply modifying the capacity of
the outer volume to be the same as the physical
capacity, which protects the hidden volume. The
implementation choice of Shrunk U-disk method is
detailed in Section 5.3.2.
The challenge is how we can modify the volume
capacity. We leverage Thin Provisioning to fill the
gap. Thin Provisioning is a novel technology de-
signed to address the storage waste problem in the
Cloud data center (DC). Because the servers are
usually installed with larger physical storage ca-
pacity than the actual size of data usage for future
2It is a convention that storage hardware vendors using
1k=1000 rather than 1k=1024 to calculate the capacity.
demands. This is called Thick Provisioning, but
the physical storage cannot reach its capacity up-
per limit before replacing the disk with a larger one.
Hence, a large amount of storage space is wasted.
Thin Provision allows operators to flexibly precon-
figure a bigger capacity of virtual volumes than the
physical capacity, and physical storage spaces are
not be used until data commit on them. When the
physical storage exhausts, the operator can install
new physical disks without modifying any previous
settings. We employ the flexibility of Thin Provi-
sioning and set the capacity of the outer volume to
be the physical capacity to mitigate the capacity
comparison attack.
(4) Fill-to-Full Attack Defense
It is natural to conduct the fill-to-full attack when
the attacker suspects the existence of the hidden
volume(s). We leverage multi-level deniability to
defend the attack. Multi-level deniability allows
users to define different levels of importance of sen-
sitive data, and each level of sensitive data is asso-
ciated with one hidden volume. To defend the fill-
to-full attack, we introduce a special level (level 0)
of deniability, which is associated with /dev/null.
As shown in Figure 8, when the attack discovers
the hidden volume and tries to conduct the fill-to-
full attack, the user uses the level 0 deniability and
gives the device to the attacker to perform the fill-
to-full attack. Attack data will first be written to
the outer volume and recorded by the Volume Man-
agement module. When the physical disk exhausts,
new attack data will be directed to /dev/null, and
the Volume Management module will occur a full
storage error when the recorded size of attack data
plus the used capacity of the outer volume before
the attack equals physical capacity.
5.3.2. Volume Management Module Composition
In this subsection, we bring the technical de-
sign details of the Volume Management module and
present how the Volume Management module man-
ages the physical disk.
The Volume Management module leverages Thin
Provisioning and Device Mapper to convert the
physical disk into a Thin Pool, which is a resource
pool consists of fine-grained storage blocks. The
Volume Management module then create virtual
logical volumes as the outer volume and hidden vol-
umes. The storage spaces of the virtual logical vol-
umes are allocated from the Thin Pool, and each
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Figure 9: The creation of the outer volume and hidden vol-
ume. The outer volume and the hidden volume are virtual
logical volumes.
virtual logical volumes allocates storage blocks dis-
tinctly from others.As depicted in Figure 9, i) the
Volume Management module converts physical disk
into a volume group with Device Mapper. Each vol-
ume group consists of one or more physical disks.
ii) Then, the Volume Management module creates
two logical devices using the created volume group
with Device Mapper, namely, the data device and
the metadata device. The data device is the stor-
age space of Thin Pool, and the metadata device
records the usage of each fine-grained storage block.
Device mapper is used to map existing block devices
into another logical block device. Device mapper
redirects or filters IO requests from logical block
devices to the mapped device (physical disk in our
case). The process can be formalized by a 5-tuple,
〈Ol, Sl, T,Dp, Op〉, where Ol denotes the sector off-
set of mapping logical volume block, and Sl is the
number of sectors of the original volume block. T
denotes the type used to describe the way of map-
ping. Dp denotes the mapped device, and Op de-
notes the offset of mapped physical volume block.
iii) Next, the Volume Management module converts
the the two devices into a Thin Pool. iv) Finally,
the Volume Management module creates two vir-
tual logical volume by using fine-grained storage
blocks in Thin Pool with Device Mapper.
We anatomize each components in the Volume
Management module in the rest of this subsection.
(1) Thin Pool is the resource pool used for vir-
tual logical volumes and created atop the encrypted
logical volume. As shown in Figure 11, it virtual-
izes the encrypt logical volume as a resource pool by
carefully splitting the whole storage space into fine-
grained storage blocks, and the outer volume and
Mounted Unmounted
Reaching timeout
Mount
Busy in 
use or
not reaching 
timeout
Figure 10: Dynamic mounting state management.
the hidden volumes allocate storage space from the
pool on demand. When one storage block in the
Thin Pool is allocated by one virtual logical vol-
ume, the storage block will be marked as used, and
it will not be allocated for other virtual logical vol-
umes. Hence the overriding problem is addressed.
The mapping of fine-grained storage blocks and vir-
tual logical volumes is stored in the metadata de-
vice in Figure 9. In our case, each block is 64KB
in size. Since each block is exclusively used by the
hidden volume or the outer volume separately, the
“reserved area” is needless. Thus, the storage uti-
lization also improves.
When creating the data and metadata logical vol-
umes, the relationship between the size of the meta-
data volume and data volume can be formalized as
follows.
Sm =
Sp
Sc
× 64, (2)
where Sm denotes the size of metadata volume. Sp
denotes the size of pool volume, and Sc denotes the
chunk size of pool volume.
(2) Virtual logical volume is the final logi-
cal volume used as an outer volume or a hidden
volume. The reason it is called “virtual” is when
creating the virtual logical volume, its storage re-
sources is not allocated until data commit on it.
The capacity assigned at the creation time is only
a label, and it does not indicate the actual capacity
it possesses. The topmost part of Figure 11 shows
the architectural level in the MobiGyges system.
In MobiGyges, the capacity of the outer volume is
configured as big as the physical volume to defend
the capacity comparison attack. Device mapper is
used to create the virtual logical volume from Thin
Pool. For applications, the usage of the virtual log-
ical volume has no differences between a physical
volume.
(3) Multi-deniability allows users to define
different levels of importance for their sensitive data
and put them into different hidden volumes corre-
sponding to different levels of deniability. Mobi-
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Figure 11: Disk layout of MobiGyges. (1) The userdata is the physical volume that used for storing user-generated data.
(2) FDE is applied to encrypt both data and the structure on top of it. (3) all the userdata storage is virtualized as a Thin
Pool. (4) virtual logical volumes are created as outer volume and hidden volume, respectively.
Gyges provides multi-deniability by creating mul-
tiple hidden volumes. Each hidden volume is re-
served for providing a specific level of deniability.
To this end, even if the hidden volume is exposed,
users may still deny the existence of sensitive data
because the attacker fails to know the number of
deniability the system provides, and which hidden
volume is used to store the sensitive data. Each
hidden volume has its name and password, and the
name is calculated from the password. Without the
password, the system cannot find the correct name
of the hidden volume and cannot mount the hidden
volume and thus fails to fetch the sensitive data
stored on it. The name of each hidden volume is
calculated with Equation 3.
N = T (h(passwd+ salt), b), (3)
where, N is the final name. T (s, b) is a trim func-
tion that trims s into a b-length string. h(x) is
a hash function that hashes x into a hash value.
passwd is the user password towards a hidden vol-
ume, and salt is used for counter rainbow table at-
tack [29].
(4) Dynamic Mounting mounts the hidden
volumes on demand. Unlike previous solutions,
which requires rebooting the device and logging into
the PDE mode to use the hidden volumes. Mo-
biGyges can use hidden volume on demand need-
less device rebooting to switch to the PDE mode.
Therefore, authenticated applications can use dy-
namic mounting to mount the needed hidden vol-
ume instantly. Due to the confidentiality of the
hidden volume, operations of authenticated appli-
cations should be cautious. When requesting for
mounting the hidden volume, an access token is
needed to validate the application, and if the to-
ken is not valid, the mounting request is rejected.
Android is a UNIX-like system, and in a UNIX-
like system, devices are presented as block device
files. Each block device file has its own name.
Therefore, when using a hidden volume, users first
enter the password of the wanted hidden volume at
authenticated application such as TriggerApp and
MobiGyges will mount the correct hidden volume
based on Equation 3. As depicted in Figure 10,
when the hidden volume is mounted, a timer is
started, and the hidden volume will be automat-
ically unmounted as the timer times out. This
mechanism protects the hidden volume from being
discovered by examining the currently mounted de-
vices.
5.3.3. TriggerApp
TriggerApp is the interface among the users and
MobiGyges’s hidden volumes. Users have to use
TriggerApp to trigger the special operations and
dynamically mount the hidden volume for storing
sensitive data. TriggerApp functionality should
be secret to prevent MobiGyges from exposing.
Therefore, TriggerApp is recommended to be im-
plemented inside a system built-in application.
6. Implementation
We implement our MobiGyges prototype sys-
tem on LineageOS 13 for Google Nexus 6P. We
choose LineageOS rather than original Android
Open Source Project because LineageOS provides
necessary vendor specific hardware adaptation like
camera and baseband driver supports. For the Vol-
ume Management component of MobiGyges, we
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add about 500 lines of C code to LineageOS, and we
port Logical Volume Management (LVM) and Thin
Provisioning tools (pdata tools) [30] and some sys-
tem building scripts to Android. For TriggerApp,
we add approximately 500 lines of Java code. In
this section, we present the implementation chal-
lenges and considerations of MobiGyges.
(1) Manipulating the userdata partition is
hard on Android. MobiGyges initialization re-
quires mounting and unmounting the userdata
partition. However, the userdata partition can-
not be unmounted while the system is running be-
cause some system files are stored on the userdata
partition, and these files are busy in use [31]. For
system stability and data integrity, the operating
system does not allow the userdata partition to
be unmounted while busy. However, the creation
of Thin Pool and virtual logical volume requires a
free (not in used) partition. To this end, we put the
Thin Pool and virtual logical volume creation pro-
cedure executing at the system booting stage before
mounting the userdata partition. We put the code
right after the FDE procedure in Android Volume
Daemon (VOLD) located at cryptfs.c. The code
executes lvm toolset by forking a child process.
(2) Running toolsets on Android is another
challenge for us because the toolsets are usually for
desktop and server that are x86 platforms rather
than the ARM-based mobile platforms. Luckily,
Android is based on Linux kernel and has the kernel
modules needed by Thin Provisioning and Device
Mapper, and the system calls are the same as desk-
top and server versions. Therefore, porting LVM
and pdata tools that are used to build logical vol-
umes, Thin Pool, and virtual logical volumes does
not require much code and building system modi-
fication. We use gcc-arm-linux-androideabi to
conduct the cross-compile. We first intended to
compile the source directly, but these tools require
libraries that should be cross compiled in advance
and made them Android runnable. Apart from
that, -enable-static link and LDFLAGS=-static
flags should be set to ensure the compilation tar-
get is statically executable. Otherwise, the toolsets
cannot run when pushing to Android because An-
droid lacks of these libraries. We also modified the
code in the Android build system to compile the
toolsets into the final installation package.
(3) TriggerApp implementation is an impor-
tant part of the work of implementing MobiGyges.
We implement our TriggerApp into the Android
system built-in Calculator. Apart from the ba-
sic calculation functionality, our tailored Calcula-
tor has the extra functionality like secret record-
ing, filming, and picturing. The calculator could
still make calculations, and otherwise, the system is
prone to expose the special design and thus compro-
mise sensitive data. As we all know, dividing any
number by 0 is an illegal operation. When users
attempt to do such an illegal operation, the sys-
tem will throw an exception and prompt an alert
to users to indicate the calculation is not allowed.
Thus, we change the exception processing behavior
of the calculator by modifying it to display a special
operation Use Interface (UI) according to what the
user enters. Identifying the divided by 0 operation
can be done by parsing the input String every time
when the user presses the ’=’ button. However,
users usually just conducts normal calculations op-
erations, and the input parsing is worthless un-
der such condition. Android applications are writ-
ten in Java3. Java has an ArithmeticException
that whenever an illegal operation occurs, it throws
an ArithmeticException. We put our parsing
code into the catch {} code block. When an
ArithmeticException is triggered, the code will
analyze the input and process the operations ac-
cordingly.
(4) Dynamic mounting is implemented as
SystemService. Normally, all kinds of Android sup-
porting hardware has the SystemServices and Hard-
ware Abstract Layer (HAL) definition pair. Apart
from that, lightweight Service and lightweight HAL
are also provided as pairs in Android. For example,
the WiFi module has both Service and HAL defi-
nitions. But the HAL definition is needless in our
system because no new physical hardware devices
are added to the system. We implement the Mobi-
Gyges SystemService by using the method provided
by [32]. Inside the dynamic mounting SystemSer-
vice, it i) calculates the trimmed hash value with
the input password and salt by using Equation 3.
The salt, uses the crypto footer of the userdata
partition in our case, and ii) it mounts the corre-
sponding hidden volume with the calculated device
name and the access token. If either the password
or the access token is incorrect, the mounting re-
quest is rejected.
3C/C++ can also be applied to Android application to
improve the running efficiency
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(5) Full Disk Encryption (FDE) is used to
protect the Volume Management module. Mobi-
Gyges first performs FDE by creating an encryp-
tion layer on the userdata partition, which makes
it easy to encrypt all data on the userdata par-
tition. MobiGyges uses 128-bit Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES) [33] with cipher-block chain-
ing (CBC) and ESSIV:SHA256 to perform the en-
cryption. The master key is encrypted with 128-bit
AES via invocations to the OpenSSL library. It is
recommended that users use 128 bits or more for the
key (with 256 being optional) to improve the secu-
rity. Figure 11(2) represents the encrypted logical
volume created atop the physical volume. It also
shows the logical position in MobiGyges. FDE is
created using the Device Mapper technology.
7. Evaluation
In this section, we describe experiments on stor-
age utilization and performance overheads by com-
paring MobiGyges with state-of-the-art works. We
conduct experiments on Google Nexus 6P mobile
phone with 3GB LPDDR4 DRAM and an octa-
core CPU with 4 Cortex-A53@1.55GHz cores and
4 Cortex-A57@2GHz cores. We use dd [34], bon-
nie++ [35], and AndroBench [36] to conduct the
experiments.
7.1. Performance Evaluation Tools
dd copies blocks of data from one file to another
and is provided by most UNIX platforms. It allows
parameters like r/w buffer size that can be easily
used for IO performance study. We also use the
fsync parameter in dd because it does not bypass
the kernel disk caches, and when it writes data to
the device, the data may still not be committed on
the device upon dd completion.
We use Bonnie++ in our experiments: an IO
benchmark tool suite that aims to perform several
simple tests of hard drive and file system perfor-
mance. It has 2 types of tests. The first is to
test the IO throughput. The second is to test cre-
ation, reading, and deleting operations on many
small files. We use the second type in our test.
AndroBench is a popular benchmark tool for An-
droid. It is an Android application, which provides
sequential/random r/w tests and SQLite bench-
marks. Since Android uses SQLite as its built-
in database for applications, the performance of
SQLite is trivial for Android Apps user experience
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Figure 12: Disk utilization result of MobiGyges (1 hidden
volume) and Mobiflage. Mobiflage∗ represents all the sys-
tems uses the same mechanism as Mobiflage.
and is closely correlated with the storage perfor-
mance.
7.2. Storage Utilization Evaluation
MobiGyges creates the Thin Pool using Equa-
tion 2 to calculate the size of metadata volume.
Hence, the capacity of Thin Pool equals to the size
of the data volume, so the size of the data volume is
the actual capacity that allows users to store their
data on the device. To this end, physical storage
utilization η can be calculated with Equation 4.
The definitions of the notations used in Equation 4
are the same as that of Equation 2 that can be
found in Table 2.
η =
Sp
Sp + Sm
=
Sp
Sp
Sc
× 64 + Sp
× 100% = 99.9024%.
(4)
We compare disk utilization of Mobiflage and
MobiMimosa with MobiGyges because most of the
related state-of-the-art works [8–10, 12] use the
same method as Mobiflage. For all experiments,
we use dd to conduct experiments, and each has 50
trials4.
As shown in Figure 12, the average disk uti-
lization of MobiGyges is 79.81%. The 20% loss
is mainly because each Ext4 file system takes up
about 10% of the storage for its metadata use [37,
38], and we have two volumes formatted with Ext4,
4Results are stable in the first 20 trials, and we conduct
another 30 trials to decrease the errors.
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one for the outer volume and the other for the hid-
den volume. Therefore, the storage space utiliza-
tion of MobiGyges is 99.76%, which is equivalent
to the theoretical result shown in Equation 4.
Offset = b0.75× vlenc
− (H(pwd ||salt)modb0.25× vlenc). (5)
Mobiflage [7] proposes Equation 5 to calculate
the offset of placing the hidden volume, and this
equation indicates the capacity of the hidden vol-
ume is between 25-50% of the total disk capacity.
Therefore, Mobiflage introduces up to 25% of the
storage waste. Since each file system takes another
10% of the capacity for metadata, and there are two
file system instances used (one used for the outer
volume and the other used for the hidden volume),
there is 20% of inevitable waste on each device.
Thus, the total storage waste for Mobiflage is 45%.
We want to get the improvement purely benefitting
from our MobiGyges design, so we add 20% for each
of the experimental results, and hence, MobiGyges
increases the storage utilization by over 30%5.
MobiMimosa [11] achieves storage utilization im-
provement by using the dm table to record the stor-
age block used by the hidden volume for the outer
volume. Therefore, the only waste is the dm table.
MobiMimosa uses the Ext4 file system, and the de-
fault block size of the Ext4 file system on Android
is 4KB. Consequently, if a hidden volume has 5GB
capacity, the size of the dm table file can be up to
64MB6, which means the size of dm table is 1.25%
of the capacity of the hidden volume. Since the
maximum size of a hidden volume is usually smaller
than a half of the total physical disk capacity, the
size of the dm table file can take up to 0.625% of
the total physical storage space. We test the stor-
age utilization on Google Nexus 6P, with the same
setting as MobiGyges. The results show that the
overall storage utilization of MobiMimosa that has
one 5GB hidden volume is 78.375%.
7.3. Performance Overhead Evaluation
Performance overhead on the PDE system is crit-
ical because the attack may compromise the PDE
system if the performance overhead is significant.
We evaluate the IO performance overhead of Mobi-
Gyges (Outer and Hidden in the figures) by compar-
ing the IO performances of MobiGyges with that of
5((79.81% + 20%)− (55% + 20%))/55% + 20%) ≈ 30%
6Each dm table item is 80 byte.
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Figure 13: Bonnie++ and dd IO performance test. Base-
line is the original Android FDE. Outer is the MobiGyges’s
outer volume, and Hidden is the MobiGyges’s hidden vol-
ume.
Android FDE (Baseline in the figures) because An-
droid FDE is enabled by default, and MobiGyges
uses Android FDE as a foundation. In the rest
of this subsection, we use different IO benchmark
tools to evaluate the performance of the system and
analyze the overhead.
(1) Bonnie++ test: We run 50 trials7 of se-
quential block tests on a 6GB file8 on each system.
Figure 13 shows that the outer volume outperforms
approximately 10% over Android FDE in terms of
reading. The reason for MobiGyges’s outer vol-
ume performs better is because of the IO request
batching mechanism. When reading sequentially,
the system can merge different IO requests, cache
them, and read a bunch of adjacent storage blocks
together [39]. However, the write performance is re-
duced by about 12%. We analyze the impact of the
performance overhead by considering the user ex-
perience. With the same 1GB file, we calculate the
time difference between MobiGyges and the base-
line (Android FDE). Therefore, in terms of reading,
MobiGyges reduces about 500ms compared with
the original Android FDE. Similarly, MobiGyges
takes 600ms longer than the original Android FDE.
We believe the performance penalty is acceptable.
Comparing the hidden volume and outer volume of
MobiGyges, the write performance is only reduced
by 3%. The reduction results from the extra en-
cryption over the hidden volume.
7The results are very stable, we run 50 trials to minimize
the error.
8Bonnie++ requires to test on a file whose size is twice
as big as the device RAM to decrease the influence of system
cache.
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Figure 14: Sequential read and write speed and random read and write speed comparing between outer volume and original
Android FDE. Tested with AndroBench. The unit of SQL operations is Q/s (query per seconds). Outer is the MobiGyges’s
outer volume and Baseline is the original Android FDE.
(2) dd test: We use the dd command to gen-
erate data from /dev/zero and write data on the
volume with buffer size 600MB for once9 to test
writing performance of MobiGyges and the original
Android system. Then, we use dd to read data from
the volume and write the output to the /dev/null
”blackhole”10, to test the reading performance of
MobiGyges and the original Android system. Nor-
mal dd version prints the statistical data after each
command finishes. However, Android system uses
the busybox [40] version dd tool that prints noth-
ing after completion. Thus, we use time command
to count the execution time. Moreover, we clear
the cache in RAM before every tests11, which elim-
inates the error caused by operating system caching
mechanism. As shown in Figure 13, dd shows equiv-
alent results as that of bonnie++.
(3) AndroBench test: Due to the permission
control of AndroBench, we fail to test the perfor-
mance of the hidden volume, but comparing the
performance differences between the Android FDE
and MobiGyges’s outer volume is still sufficient to
show the performance overhead of MobiGyges. Fig-
ure 14 depicts the result of the AndroBench tests.
In the random r/w (RND-W and RND-R) and se-
quential write (SEQ-W) tests, MobiGyges has a
performance penalty due to the Thin Pool and
9dd if=/dev/zero of=disk.img bs=600M count=1
conv=fsync
10dd if=disk.img of=/dev/null bs=600M count=1
11echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop caches
device mapping. In the sequential read (SEQ-R)
test, MobiGyges outperforms the baseline because
of merged IO requests and batch fetching mecha-
nism. For SQL queries, MobiGyges reduces about
8% of the performance compared with the baseline.
However, in terms of modifying data, which writes
data on the volume, the performance penalty can be
up to 22%. SQLite uses VDBE (Virtual Database
Engine) as its background engine, and VDBE uses
the B-Tree data structure to store data on a file sys-
tem. VDBE also adopts the concept of paging as a
unit to allocate space for the value of a key, which
is similar to pages in the operating system virtual
memory mechanism. The size of a page is fixed,
so if the record is bigger than a page, it has to be
stored into several pages that are linked together
using pointers. To this end, it has to first read
all the pages associated with the key before VDBE
can finally update the record. Consequently, the
multiple writes downgrade the performance of SQL
queries, but We believe the performance penalty for
the SQL operations is acceptable [41].
7.4. Performance Overhead Comparison
In this subsection, we compare the performance
overhead between MobiGyges and some recent re-
lated works. Note that MobiGyges is not optimized
for improving the IO performance. We post our IO
performance overhead comparison experimental re-
sults here for the further optimization target.
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Figure 15: Performance overhead. the lower, the better. We
use FDE (LUKS [19] on Linux) as the baseline.
We implement disk management part of Mob-
iflage [7], MobiHydra [8], MobiMimosa [11], Mo-
biCeal [12] on Linux desktop PC and evaluate their
performance with dd. The experimental results are
shown in Figure 15, and the baseline system is the
Android FDE12. Mobiflage, MobiHydra and Mo-
biMimosa are native solutions, and their outer vol-
ume and the hidden volume are implemented in
the same way as Android FDE. Hence, they have
the equivalent performance to the Android FDE.
MobiCeal and MobiGyges leverage storage virtual-
ization mechanisms, which introduce performance
overheads. MobiGyges outperforms MobiCeal on
the performance overhead.
8. Discussion
In this section, we discuss counter-measurements
of MobiGyges towards defending common attacks,
and we then discuss the drawback and possible fu-
ture works.
8.1. Security Discussion
Common attacks are identified by the existing
literature and can be solved by existing counter-
measurements. MobiGyge’s mechanism of defend-
ing these attacks makes no difference to existing
ones, and the discussion is to show that MobiGyges
considers defending common attacks by design. Ex-
periments of validating these mechanisms have been
listed as part of our future works.
12We implement Android FDE by using LUKS on Linux.
(1) Password guessing is the attack by try-
ing all possible password characters repeatedly in
a brute force way to identify the correct password.
MobiGyges provides both salt and retrial timeout
mechanism that can efficiently defend the password
guessing attack and the rainbow table attack.
(2) Raw data parsing is conducted by parsing
the physical disk raw data and try to reconstruct
the files. MobiGyges uses FDE to defend the raw
data parsing attack, in which all data are encrypted
before committing to the physical disk.
(3) Encryption primitive leakage means the
type of encryption or data protection is leaked. In
the hidden volume based PDE, it refers to hidden
volumes are exposed and is generally conducted
from parsing the raw physical disk data. Mobi-
Gyges allocates fine-grained storage blocks from
Thin Pool for the outer volume and hidden vol-
umes on demands, which stores data in a striped
way. Thus, attackers cannot tell the belonging of
each data block and fail to distinguish from volume
to volume. Moreover, MobiGyges applies FDE for
Thin Pool, which increases the complexity and pro-
tects hidden volumes.
(4) Flash storage leakage refers to the NADN
flash storage structure used by mobile devices could
leak sensitive data because flash storage executes
writing or wiping data in the unit of page, and can
only change some bits in the page to 0 or change all
bits in the page to 1. Hence, writing happens only
on an empty page (with all 1s). Thus, data needs
another temporary page for saving the current un-
changed data in the original page. This tempo-
rary page can leak the sensitive data if not erased
in time. MobiGyges addresses this problem with
FDE, and data on flash pages is not the plain data
but cipher data, which mitigates the flash storage
leakage.
(5) Mobile carrier leakage represents the pos-
sible inconsistent record from the mobile device and
the mobile carrier provider. The existing literature
separate working modes into two, and PDE can
only be used under the PDE mode. At the time
using the PDE mode, carrier informations (e.g.,
phone call history, cellular traffic usage) are stored
on the hidden volume, and attackers will find that
these informations recorded by the carrier provider
are more than that recorded by the outer volume.
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Thus, this is prone to expose hidden volumes. Mo-
biGyges eliminates mobile carrier leakage by remov-
ing the design of two modes, and all the informa-
tions are stored on the outer volume. Thus, carrier
information records are consistent between the car-
rier provider and the outer volume, which mitigates
the leakage.
8.2. Drawbacks and Future Works
Although MobiGyges brings new hope to the
PDE community, it falls short when the attacker
can record the fill-to-full attack data and tries to
retrieve the filled data from the device. One pos-
sible remedy is to employ data compression tech-
niques to mitigate this issue. MobiGyges also opens
up several interesting directions for future research.
For example, theoretically evaluating the mathe-
matically model of MobiGyges and existing works,
reducing the performance overhead by replacing
the Linux Thin Provisioning module with newly
proposed high-performance Thin Provisioning tools
(e.g., ThinStore [42]), and conducting further ex-
periments in terms of defending common attacks
(e.g., rainbow table attack).
9. Conclusion
This paper has presented MobiGyges, a PDE
system that addresses the problems of data loss,
storage waste, and device reboot on existing PDE
systems by splitting the physical storage into fine-
grained storage blocks, and each storage block
is used only by one volume, and using Dynamic
Mounting service to mount the hidden volume with-
out rebooting the device. We have also identi-
fied the capacity comparison attack and fill-to-full
attack targeted at PDE systems, and MobiGyges
can jointly leverages the Shrunk U-disk method
and multi-level deniability to defend them. We
have implemented a proof-of-concept system on
LineageOS 13 for real mobile devices. Experimen-
tal results show that MobiGyges achieves over 30%
storage utilization improvement with an acceptable
performance overhead.
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